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The reporting of financial results is among the most important activities conducted by 
any organization. Financial reporting provides a basis on which parties inside and outside an 
organization can judge the organization’s effectiveness at conducting its core activities and 
determine its future financial viability. Donors use financial reports to examine whether not-for-
profits efficiently use their donations; investors use financial reports to determine if a company is 
worthwhile place for their assets; voters use government financial reports to analyze whether 
they are receiving the services they expect for the tax dollars they are obligated to provide. The 
ability to perform such critical analysis is contingent on financial reporting that provides an 
accurate interpretation of the economic reality of organizations.  
Introduction 
To maintain the efficacy and comparability of financial reporting in the United States, 
standards for accounting and financial reporting have been created and modified. These 
standards are typically called Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, better known by its 
acronym of GAAP (pronounced like gap).  Standards such as GAAP were created to provide the 
most effective and accurate methods of communicating the financial results of an organization. 
Without such standards, entities would likely use many different standards, some of which might 
accurately reflect economic reality and provide comparability across entities, and some of which 
may not. Standards encompass topics such as what should be considered revenue for an 
organization, or how an organization properly communicates the cost of a building that it will 
use for 20 years. These standards provide the basis for comparability between organizations of 
the same type and allow one to determine that company A is more profitable than company B. 
These same standards may expose that indicate a high chance of bankruptcy in the near future, or 
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show that a certain not for profit spends a higher portion of its donations on its core mission 
rather than administrative overhead, versus another.  
To provide these standards, entities such as the Financial Accounting Standards Board, 
the Association of Certified Public Accountants, the Government Accounting Standards Board, 
the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, and the Internal Revenue Service have been 
given some level of authority to determine what these standards should be for certain types of 
organizations. The organizations deliberate the merits of communicating the financial and 
economic activities of organizations in various ways, all with the purpose of ensuring that 
financial reporting is accurate and useful. 
Periodically over the course of recent history, there have been times where the accuracy 
or efficacy of the accounting and reporting standards provided and the organizations providing 
those standards have come into question. After the collapse of Enron in 2001, there was crisis of 
confidence in our methods of financial reporting in the United States. Many wondered how such 
an immense fraud could be committed by a public company that must provide financial results to 
investors every quarter. Enron, as well as other corporate frauds committed around that period, 
contributed to the passing of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 by the U.S. Congress, which 
completely changed the manner in which financial reporting of public companies in the United 
States is regulated. Because of Enron and Sarbanes-Oxley, there is now much more 
accountability around and awareness of the standards for public company financial reporting in 
the United States and the rest of the world. 
While there has not been such a crisis yet, the world of government accounting standards 
is ripe with the possibility of disaster in the near future. According to the U.S. Bureau of 
Economic Analysis, state and local government spending totaled 12.5 percent of U.S. GDP in 
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2009, or around $1.77 trillion.1 Although state and local spending is immense, the financial 
reporting standards for the public sector are not nearly as well developed as for public 
companies. The accounting and financial reporting standards for government entities are only 
semi-officially determined by the Government Accounting Standards Board (GASB). The 
GASB, unlike its private sector counterpart, is not the official standard setter for all public sector 
entities, but only ones which reside in states that have statutorily required government entities in 
their boundaries to follow the GASB’s General Accept Accounting Principles2. Many other 
public sector organizations follow GASB’s GAAP in spite of the fact that they are not required 
to do so.3
 In addition to the issues of comparability and consistency across government entities that 
exists today, the way the GASB is structured and funded presents significant obstacles to it 
providing the most accurate and relevant financial reporting standards. The GASB is 
 Regardless, there does not exist nearly the same level of standards and comparability 
in public sector financial reporting as there does among publicly traded companies. This means 
that government financial reporting is not nearly as useful to its users, primarily ordinary citizens 
and municipal bond holders, as it can and should be. For example, the financial information 
available to judge the soundness of bonds for one municipality may not very comparable to other 
similar municipalities. Or if a resident of city was curious about the effectiveness of police 
spending in his city versus others, he or she would be disappointed to find that different cities 
may use entirely different standards to determine what those numbers are, making such analysis 
difficult if not impossible. 
                                                          
1  "National Income and Product Accounts Table," Bureau of Economic Analysis, 
http://www.bea.gov/national/nipaweb/TableView.asp?SelectedTable=5&ViewSeries=NO&Java=no&Request3Place
=N&3Place=N&FromView=YES&Freq=Year&FirstYear=2009&LastYear=2010&3Place=N&Update=Update&Jav
aBox=no#Mid11 November, 2010). 
2  D. S. Loyd and Michael A. Crawford, "GASB Research on the use of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles," 
Governmental GAAP Update Service 8, no. 12 (06/30, 2008), 1. 
3  ibid. 
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significantly underfunded as of late. The GASB also depends on sources of funds that are both 
inconsistent year-to-year and present significant potential conflicts of interest for the 
organization. Further, a majority of the members of the GASB have built in potential conflicts of 
interest because they serve on the board part-time while holding positions in state and local 
government. The presence of political officials on the board, as well as other factors, have meant 
that the GASB is very subject to political winds in its policies and has show hesitation in making 
tough decisions in the face of significant political opposition. All of this means that even if the 
GASB were to become the official source of GAAP for all state and local government entities, as 
it theoretically should, it would not have adequate resources and would not be properly aligned 
to meet that task. 
A great example of the politics and difficulties the GASB has faced has revolved around 
the issue of properly accounting for future defined benefit retirement obligations, better known 
as pensions. Over the last couple of years, the board has been immersed in a significant debate 
about whether its current standards for pension accounting accurately reflect economic reality. 
This debate has become politically charged, with representatives and local government officials 
of all stripes weighing in against changes backed by economists and the board. The controversy 
and the arguably tempered changes currently proposed by the board indicate that that a thorough 
examination of the board’s structure and role, as well as consideration of significant changes to 
the board are well justified. 
In order to demonstrate the need for significant change to the GASB, this thesis will 
provide context as to the current structure and funding of the GASB and the history of its 
formation. In addition, this thesis will go into depth as to the recent debate around defined 
benefit pension accounting, and examine the potential scope of problems that exist in that area as 
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well as the GASB’s half-hearted attempt to shed light on those problems. Finally this thesis will 
endeavor to provide a path forward for the GASB that will set government accounting in the 
right direction. While this thesis will briefly address the recent history of accounting standards 
production for the Federal government, this thesis does not attempt to provide a thorough 
examination of that area nor provide recommendations that are pertinent to it. An argument 
could most certainly be made for Federal accounting standards setting to fall within the scope of 
the GASB, but the perceived urgency of the subject by the writer is not nearly as high as 
reforming the accounting standards and standard setting for state and local governments. 
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Chapter I: Current Structure and Funding of the FAF, FASB and GASB 
A) The Financial Accounting Foundation (FAF)  
The Financial Accounting Foundation (FAF) is a 501(c)(3) not-for-profit 
corporation that acts as the parent organization to both the Governmental Accounting 
Standards Board, and the Financial Accounting Standards Board.1 The Foundation is 
managed by a Board of Trustees that is responsible for providing oversight, financial and 
administrative management for the Governmental and Financial Accounting Standards 
Boards and their respective Advisory Councils.2 However, the Board is explicitly 
prohibited from involvement in the accounting standard making process, in order to 
preserve the independence of the boards’ work. The by-laws of the FAF clearly articulate 
the independence of the standard setting boards relative to the foundation itself, “Trustees 
shall not, by or in connection with the exercise of their power of approval over annual 
budgets or their periodic review of such operating and project plans, direct the FASB or 
the GASB to undertake or to omit to undertake any particular project or activity or 
otherwise affect the exercise by the FASB or GASB of their authority, functions, and 
powers in respect of standards of financial accounting and reporting.”3
                                                          
1  Financial Accounting Foundation 2009 Annual Report (Norwalk, CT: Financial Accounting Foundation, 
2010), 3. 
 However, in 
fulfilling its oversight responsibilities, the Foundation’s trustees are instructed to examine 
the short and long run goals of the Boards, as well as their effectiveness at meeting those 
goals. 
2  By-Laws of the Financial Accounting Foundation (Norwalk, CT: Financial Accounting Foundation, 
2010), 2. 
3  ibid., 2 
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The Board of Trustees is made up of between fourteen and eighteen members, the 
number of which is decided upon by a majority vote of the trustees.4 The members of the 
Trustees serve five year terms that are staggered so that every year a “class” consisting of 
at least one trustee finishes its term. The trustees are made up of two groupings: 
governmental trustees and at-large Trustees.5 The governmental trustees, of which there 
are at least three, must have experience as an elected official or government financial 
officer, as determined by the sitting Trustees.6 The at-large trustees may be anyone who 
has relevant experience from nearly any field, as determined by the Trustees. 
Nominations for the at-large Trustees may come from any interested party or group. 
Nominations for the Governmental Trustees must come from one of nine Governmental 
Organizations such as the National Governors Association and the National League of 
Cities.7 A majority of the Trustees must not be currently associated with a public 
accounting firm, or have been associated with one in the prior two years.8
                                                          
4  ibid., 2 
 The seven 
member Appointments and Evaluations Committee of the Trustees then considers the 
nominations and recommends nominees for approvals by the full board. If nominations 
from the governmental organizations for the Governmental Trusteeship are determined to 
not be suitable to the committee or the full board, they must notify the governmental 
organizations, which may then nominate alternative candidates for that position. The 
Appointments and Evaluations committee is also responsible for the evaluation and 
recommendation of potential board members for the FASB and the GASB. 
5  ibid., 3 
6  ibid., 3 
7  ibid., 2 
8  ibid., 6 
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The Foundation’s overall budget, inclusive of the activities of both standards 
boards, is around $48 million dollars.9
 
 The FASB, the GASB and the Foundation are all 
based out of the same facility located in Norwalk, Connecticut. 
B) The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB). 
Created in 1973, The Financial Accounting Standards Board is responsible for 
determining standards of financial accounting for non-governmental entities.10 The FASB 
is recognized as the authoritative source of financial accounting standards for public 
companies by both the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the American 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA).11  The SEC is statutorily the ultimate 
arbiter of financial accounting and reporting standards for public companies in the United 
States by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, but has traditionally mostly deferred to 
the FASB in determining what those standards should be.12
The FASB is made up of five full time board members that are appointed by the 
FAF Trustees to serve up to two five years terms. A staff of over sixty people currently 
supports the board in researching and determining standards. None of the current Board 
Members are associated with or employed by public accounting firms or public 
corporations.
 
13
                                                          
9  Government Accounting Standards Board Statement of Budgeted Revenues and Expenses for the Year 
Ending December 31, 2010 (Norwalk, CT: Government Accounting Standards Board, 2009), 1. 
 Two of the board members served the FASB as technical staff for 
10  Financial Accounting Foundation 2009 Annual Report, 1 
11  "Facts about FASB," Financial Accounting Foundation, 
http://www.fasb.org/jsp/FASB/Page/SectionPage&cid=1176154526495 (accessed 23 November, 2010). 
12  ibid. 
13  "The Financial Accounting Standards Advisory Council," Financial Accounting Foundation, 
http://www.fasb.org/cs/ContentServer?c=Page&pagename=FASB%2FPage%2FSectionPage&cid=121822
0137466 (accessed 23 November, 2010). 
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multiple years between leaving their positions as partners at major public accounting 
firms and joining the board.14
The board is also advised by a thirty six member Financial Accounting Standards 
Advisory Council (FASAC) that includes senior corporate executives, academics, 
institutional investors and partners at public accounting firm.
 
15 The council is tasked with 
serving as the proverbial “boots on the ground” for the FASB, by providing advice on 
potential priorities and agenda items from their current experiences in the private 
sector.16 The makeup of the council is determined by the Trustees of the FAF.17 Members 
serve one year terms, with a limit of four total terms.18 The council holds quarterly 
meetings at the FASB offices with members of the FASB, FASB technical staff and the 
Chief Accountant of the SEC.19
 
 
C) The Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB) 
The Governmental Accounting Standards Board is tasked with determining the 
financial accounting and reporting standards for all governmental entities that are not a 
part of the Federal Government. The GASB is made up of six part-time board members 
and one full-time chairman of the Board.20
                                                          
14  Facts about FASB 
 Unlike the FASB, members of the board can 
and frequently do serve on the GASB while also holding a full-time position in areas 
15  The Financial Accounting Standards Advisory Council 
16  ibid. 
17  ibid. 
18  ibid. 
19  ibid. 
20  By-Laws of the Financial Accounting Foundation, 16 
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such as state or local government and academia. Currently four of the seven members of 
the GASB hold public office or work in the public sector in a financial capacity.21
Members of the GASB are appointed by the FAF Trustees.  The Appointments 
and Evaluations Committee of the FAF Trustees evaluate the nominations for the GASB 
and recommend them to the full board for approval.
 
22 Any FAF governmental trustees 
that do not serve on the Appointments and Evaluation Committee normally, ex-officio 
serve on the committee when considering appointments to the GASB.23 Members of the 
GASB can only be removed by a two thirds vote of all the FAF trustees, and only 
because of: disability, malfeasance or alleged malfeasance, or “other cause deemed by 
such Trustees as reasonably evidencing conduct detrimental to the purposes or repute of 
the GASB.”24
The GASB is generally considered the official source of Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles (GAAP) for state and local government entities. A study of GAAP 
usage by government entities indicated that thirty six states have some level of regulation 
or statutes that requires that some or all governmental units utilize GAAP.
 
25 Also, about 
26 percent of counties, localities and independents school districts are required to utilize 
gap in preparing their annual financial statements by virtue of statute or regulations.26 For 
all types of governmental units, 67 percent actually utilize GAAP, whether required to or 
not.27
                                                          
21  Michael Corkery, "Pension Dispute Ensnares A Board," Wall Street Journal, Oct 1, 2010. 
 
22  By-Laws of the Financial Accounting Foundation, 16 
23  ibid., 16 
24  ibid., 16 
25  D. S. Loyd and Michael A. Crawford, "GASB Research on the use of Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles," Governmental GAAP Update Service 8, no. 12 (06/30, 2008), 1. 
26  ibid. 
27  ibid. 
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The GASB staff and board members are advised by the Government Accounting 
Standards Advisory Council (GASAC). The function of the GASAC is to provide 
suggestions as to the major technical issues that the GASB should devote its resources to, 
advise the GASB on its agenda, provide feedback to the GASB on technical exposure 
drafts and pronouncements its issues and to suggest priorities as to the issues before the 
board.28 The GASAC is also tasked with helping to fundraise for the GASB and 
FASAC.29
Members are appointed to the GASAC by the FAF Trustees for two year terms, 
and while there are no explicit term limits, members “ordinarily serve no more than three 
consecutive terms.”
 
30 Sixteen Organizations and the United States General Accounting 
Office are invited to nominate members to the council per the by-laws of the FAF.31  The 
organizations include the American Accounting Association, the American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants as well as the Association of Government Accountants and 
thirteen other governmental organizations. In addition, the by-laws instruct the FAF 
Trustees to seek “An individual who is knowledgeable in the municipal bond rating 
process, an individual knowledgeable in underwriting government securities offerings, 
and a user of the financial reports of state and local governmental entities (such as a bank 
or insurance company investment officer).”32
 
   
 
                                                          
28  By-Laws of the Financial Accounting Foundation, 22 
29  ibid., 21 
30  ibid., 21 
31  ibid., 21 
32  ibid., 21 
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D) Standard Setting Process 
Both the GASB and the FASB follow the same general model for how they go 
about the process of forming accounting standards. The FASB and the GASB typically 
receive requests or suggestions to provide guidance in certain areas from various sources, 
such as their respective advisory boards or the public at large. Those ideas are researched 
and considered by the chairman and members of the relevant board. A board, in 
consultation with its staff and the Foundation trustees, may choose to add a project to its 
technical agenda.33 Following placement on the technical agenda, the staff of the board 
researches and identifies major issues with respect to that area that the board then 
deliberates and considers at public meetings. The board then issues what is called an 
“Exposure Draft” that reveals potential technical accounting changes under 
consideration.34 The exposure draft is debated at public forums with board members 
present, and comments are solicited and considered by the staff of the board. When the 
board has come to a decision, it either issues Accounting Standard Updates (FASB) or 
Statements and Interpretations (GASB) that describe the changed or new accounting 
standards.35
 
 
E) Funding Sources 
The Government Accounting Standards Board and the Financial Accounting 
Standards board have different but intertwined sources of funding. As the designated 
private accounting standard setting organization recognized by the SEC under the 
                                                          
33  Financial Accounting Foundation 2009 Annual Report, 2 
34  ibid., 2 
35  ibid., 2 
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authority given to it by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the FASB is able to collect an 
assessment from equity and investment company issuers in order to cover the expenses of 
determining and providing accounting standards.36 The assessment is the primary source 
of funds for the FASB, and makes up 75% of the FAF’s operating Revenue.37 According 
to Section 109 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the amount that the FASB may assess on 
equity issuers is not to exceed the “recoverable budget expenses of the standard setting 
body.”38 In the 2009 fiscal year, these fees totaled $28.9 million.39
The assessment is allocated to equity issuers who have a monthly average market 
capitalization greater than $25 million, or investment company issuers with an average 
market capitalization or net asset value great than $250 million. The allocation to each 
firm is based on the average monthly market capitalization of the firm during the 12 
months immediately preceding the beginning of the FASB fiscal year, relative to the total 
market capitalization of all issuers during that period.
  
40 The purpose of the assessment 
according to Section 109 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is to provide an “Independent, stable 
source of funding” for the standard setting board.41 The FASB delegates the collection of 
the assessment to the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB)42, which is 
also authorized under Section 109 to collect such an assessment.43
In addition, Section 109 allows the SEC designated standard setting body to receive 
ancillary revenue such as earnings from publication sales in addition to the accounting 
 
                                                          
36  ibid., 35 
37  ibid., 35 
38 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, U.S. Statutes at Large 116 (2002) 745 
39  ibid., 35 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid. 
42  ibid., 35 
43 Ibid. 
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support fee.44 The publication revenue of the FASB totaled $12.49 million in 2009.45 
68% of this revenue was from publication license fees received from publisher 
agreements, 13% from subscription fees for regular publications such as Accounting 
Standards Updates (ASUs), with the rest coming from miscellaneous forms of 
publication.46
 The Government Accounting Standards Board is funded in a very different 
manner than its sibling institution. The GASB does not have an accounting support fee 
that it may assess in order to fund its work. In fact that GASB has very little direct 
revenue in order to cover its expenses. According to GASB’s published budget for 2010, 
which also indicates its budgeted and actual results for 2009, the GASB had an excess of 
expenses over revenue of $3.82 million in fiscal year 2009.
 
47
The GASB’s two primary sources of revenue are the sales of publications and 
contributions. Net of the direct costs associated, the GASB had publication revenue of 
$1.45 million, of which 41% was from subscription fees from regular publications, 37% 
was from license fees from publishers, 17% was from bound editions and the rest from 
other miscellaneous publications.
 More extraordinarily, the 
GASB budgeted an excess of expenses over revenue for the 2010 fiscal year of $4.46 
million. 
48
                                                          
44 Ibid. 
 Contributions to the GASB totaled $1.23 million in 
fiscal year 2009, 69% of which came from state governments, and 11% from local 
45  ibid., 36 
46  ibid., 36 
47  Government Accounting Standards Board Statement of Budgeted Revenues and Expenses for the Year 
Ending December 31, 2010, 1 
48  Financial Accounting Foundation 2009 Annual Report, 35 
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governments. In 2008, a voluntary municipal bond fee contributed 10% of GASB’s 
revenue; however those contributions dropped to a negligible level in 2009.49
 
  
F) The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
The SEC was created by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in order to properly 
regulate public company reporting and the securities industry.50 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
gave the SEC the ability to recognize accounting standards coming from a standard 
setting entity as Generally Accepted for the purposes of securities laws if that entity 
meets certain criteria laid out in the act.51 Since the act, it has recognized the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board as that entity.52
The SEC has never been given comparable authority over municipal entities, even 
those issuing securities. Municipal entities do not need to register any securities offerings 
with the SEC, as public companies must do, nor must they provide periodic financial 
reports.
 Thus, when a public company runs afoul of 
GAAP as determined by the FASB and approved by the SEC, the SEC uses its civil 
enforcement powers to bring lawsuits in Federal court or civil administrative 
proceedings. 
53 Additionally, the SEC’s power to determine the accounting and financial 
reporting standards under Section 19 of the Securities Act of 1933 and section 13(b) 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 does not apply to issuers of municipal securities.54
                                                          
49  ibid., 35 
 
50 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, U.S. Statutes at Large 89 (1934) 74. 
51 Ibid. 
52  Facts about FASB 
53  Andrew Ackerman, "SEC Looks to Target Tower Amendment," Bond Buyer, May 13, 2009. 
54  ibid. 
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However, municipalities are subject to some of the anti-fraud provisions of those acts55, 
and the SEC has recently used them to pursue a case against New Jersey for failing to 
properly report the health of its pension system.56
In addition to those prior exemptions, the Tower Amendment of 1975 amended 
the 1934 Securities Act to further prevent the SEC from becoming involved in the 
financial reporting requirements of municipal entities that issue securities.
 
57 The Tower 
Amendment prevents the SEC from requiring any filings from issuers of municipal 
securities before the sale of those securities.58 As a workaround, the SEC has used the 
combination of anti-fraud provisions of the acts and Exchange Act Rule 15c2-12 –which 
requires broker-dealers to produce the issuer’s official offering statement – in order to put 
the onus for disclosure requirements on the underwriters of the bonds.59
                                                          
55  ibid. 
 
56  Zachary A. Goldfarb, "SEC Accuses New Jersey of Bond Fraud; First Time a State is Charged with 
Securities Violation," The Washington Post, August 19, 2010. 
57  Ackerman, SEC Looks to Target Tower Amendment, 408 
58  ibid. 
59  ibid. 
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Chapter II: History of Government Financial Reporting Standards and the creation 
of the Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB) 
A) Pre-GASB Government Accounting Standards 
In 1906, the National Association of Comptrollers and Accounting Officers 
(NACAO) was formed to organize and guide government accounting standards and 
provide some semblance of comparability.1 The NACAO would later become the 
Municipal Finance Officers Association (MFOA) in 1932 and became the Government 
Finance Officers Association (GFOA) in 1946.2 In 1934, a GFOA predecessor formed 
the National Committee on Municipal Accounting (NCMA), which would become the 
National Committee on Government Accounting (NCGA) in 1949 and then the National 
Council on Government Accounting (NCGA) in 1973.3 The NCGA produced accounting 
guidance from 1951-1973 in a publication called Government Accounting, Auditing, and 
Financial Reporting (GAAFR).4 In 1974, the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants (AICPA) started providing additional guidance through a publication 
entitled State and Local Government Industry Audit Guide.5 Around this time, people in 
the profession started to criticize the NCGA for not being representative of its users, not 
being independent of the profession it was setting standards for and for not having the 
adequate staff or financial resources necessary to do its job.6
                                                          
1  Craig Foltin, "A Long and Winding Road," CPA Journal 80, no. 2 (02, 2010), 23. 
 Also around this time, the 
2  ibid., 23 
3  ibid., 23 
4  ibid., 23 
5  ibid., 23 
6  James L. Chan, Research in Governmental and Non-Profit Accounting,: JAI Press Inc., 1985), 5. 
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defaults of New York City and Cleveland, Ohio served to highlight the growing need for 
better financial reporting relating to municipal securities.  
In May of 1979, Senator Harrison Williams of New Jersey introduced a bill that 
would have amended the 1934 Securities Exchange Act to create a federal council of the 
Secretary of the Treasury, the Chairman of the SEC and the Comptroller General of the 
United States or representatives on their behalf.7 This council would appoint 11 members 
to a private sector institute with a budget of $2 million that would determine accounting 
standards for state and local governments that would be nationally recognized.8 Senator 
Paul Sarbanes, made famous twenty years later by a bill he co-sponsored with Senator 
Mike Oxley, was also a co-sponsor of the bill.9
 
 The prospect of Federal intervention in 
state and local government accounting led to discussions of the creation of an alternative 
to the NCGA in order to blunt potential federal intervention. 
B) The Formation of the GASB 
An important consideration to designing a new standards setting body, was 
AICPA Rule 203 of the Rules of Conduct of the Code of Professional Ethics. The rule 
does not allow a certified public accountant to express an audit opinion as to 
conformance with GAAP, if those statements contain a material difference from the 
standards created by FASB.10
                                                          
7  ibid., 8 
 Since 1974, the Institute’s Committee on Governmental 
Accounting and Auditing produced guides that reproduced and reconciled NCGA 
8  ibid., 8 
9  ibid., 8 
10  ibid., 9 
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standards, making them Rule 203 eligible.11 In considering government standard setting 
organizations, the AICPA Board of Directors established that for any organization to 
produce standards that it would deem acceptable under Rule 203, the structure of the 
board and any supervisory foundation would have to be independent and not under the 
control of government representatives.12
In 1980, The Financial Accounting Foundation and the Financial Accounting 
Standards Board made some initial proposals that would bring some level of government 
financial reporting standards under the auspices of the Financial Accounting Standards 
Board (FASB), which provided standards for publically traded corporations.
 
13 However, 
the idea of the FASB setting government as well as private sector account standards was 
not popular with government officials who felt that the FASB would not duly appreciate 
what they believed the inherent differences required for government financial reporting.14 
In late 1979, the FAF decided against pursuing the idea of FASB as a government 
accounting standard setter, and instead started investigating the creation of a new 
standards board for government accounting under its auspices.15  The FAF became 
concerned however with how the FASB and GASB would interact and about the amount 
of resources involved.16 So instead, in 1980, the Financial Accounting Foundation came 
out in support of the idea restructuring the National Council on Governmental 
Accounting rather than the creation of a new entity.17
                                                          
11  ibid., 10 
 The FAF proposed ways that the 
NCGA could become more professional, such as increasing its staff, separating from the 
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Municipal Finance Officers Association and the creation of an independent oversight 
organization of which the FAF would be a part of. 
In 1980 an organization named the Government Accounting Board Organizing 
Committee (GASBOC) was created by the FAF, AICPA, MFOA and the National 
Association of State Auditors, Comptrollers, and Treasurers (NASACT) to hammer out a 
plan for a new government accounting standards organization18. For the next two years, 
the debate within the GASBOC would oscillate between the FAF assuming oversight 
responsibility for a new government standards organization, and forming a new 
organization called the Government Accounting Foundation (GAF), which would be 
similar in structure to the FAF.19 Either way, the foundation charged would have 
oversight over the new Government Accounting Standards Board. The idea of creating a 
separate organization proved unpopular with the FAF, which was concerned that 
government representatives would have an effective veto over any standards created.20 
Additionally, some of the proposed sponsoring entities of the foundation did not agree 
with the proposal, leading the GASBOC to drop the idea in 1981.21 Later in 1981, the 
GASBOC reached a tentative agreement that would request that the FAF oversee the 
GASB.22
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 In November of 1982, the FAF and the government organizations reached an 
agreement as to the nature of the GASB, entitled “A Proposed Structure for a 
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Governmental Accounting Standards Board.”23 The FAF started to move forward but was 
somewhat stymied by the lack of endorsement by the “Public Interest Groups.”24
The “Public Interest Groups” are seven associations of elected or appointed 
official members. They include the National Conference of State Legislators and National 
Governors Association.
 
25 The Public Interest Groups were unhappy that they were given 
a lone trustee representative on the FAF board.26 Of the three additional trustees to be 
added to the FAF, the public interests groups were entitled to nominate one under the 
initial 1982 agreement, while the MFOA and the NASACT could nominate one as well.27 
To eventually win their backing, the MFOA and the NASACT agreed to drop their 
exclusive nomination ability over their respective trustee seats, and instead the nine 
organizations collectively became responsible for nominating the three government 
trustees.28
In 1984, one last issue held up the startup of the GASB: jurisdiction. The public 
interests groups wanted specific delineation of the comparative roles of the FASB and the 
GASB before the GASB could start its work.
 
29 In the agreement, the FAF was given 
responsibility for sorting out jurisdictional issues between the two boards.30 GASB was 
charged with establishing the standards for state and local government entities, while 
FASB was given responsibility over all other entities.31
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that FASB pronouncements would also be applicable to government entities unless 
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specific GASB pronouncements superseded them.32 Also, provision was made that within 
certain parts of the public sector, FASB standards would still apply for separately issued 
financial statements.33 The purpose of this was to allow government owned utilities, 
public authorities, hospitals and other entities to follow FASB for their specific financial 
statements.34 For combined statements issued directly by state and local government 
entities, the GASB standards applied.35
In the first few years of the GASB’s existence, the standards hierarchy that made 
FASB pronouncements applicable unless GASB had provided a relevant pronouncement 
caused the GASB some difficulty. In order to allow time to develop its own standards 
that were more tailored to state and local governments, the GASB had to issue so called 
“negative standards” that allowed governments to ignore FASB standards that the GASB 
thought would be onerous to temporarily follow.
 
36 After a fifth year review of the GASB 
in 1989 by the FAF trustees, and the issuance of Statement of Auditing Standards No. 69 
by the AICPA, the hierarchy was changed so that the GASB must affirmatively approve 
of any FASB standard before it applied to government financial reporting.37
Aside from difficulties it incurred in adjusting FASB standards, in its opening 
years the GASB focused on providing a conceptual framework, which would fall low on 
the accounting standards hierarchy, but would underlie all of its future technical 
statements. The GASB also addressed certain areas such as the financial reporting model, 
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pensions and the reporting entity.38 In May of 1987, the GASB issued Concepts 
Statement No. 1, Objectives of Financial Reporting, which was notable because it made 
clear that government financial statements needed to be relevant not only to the 
community of municipal securities investors, but also to the general public as a means 
hold governments accountable.39
The GASB encountered the biggest threat to its existence in its attempt to create 
performance based reporting, called Service Efforts and Accomplishments (SEA) starting 
in 1989. In attempting to create SEA reporting and incorporate it into the financial 
statements of governments, the members of the GASB wanted to provide a basis for 
citizens to analyze the effectiveness and efficiency with which governments used tax 
dollars.
 
40 In 2003, the GASB issued Special GASB Report – Reporting Performance 
Information: Suggest Criteria for Effective Communication, which detailed 16 possible 
criteria for performance measurement.41 While government officials were somewhat 
annoyed by the publication of that report, GASB’s addition of SEA reporting to its 
technical agenda in 2006 truly brought things to head.42 The GFOA was so incensed at 
the prospect that it argued to the FAF trustees that such a project was outside of the 
jurisdiction of the GASB.43 The FAF sided with the GASB, but the GFOA attempted to 
unite other government organizations in questioning GASB’s standard setting status and 
encouraged that its role to be transferred to the FASB.44
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embraced SEA reporting, and the GASB stressed that the standards it was attempting to 
develop for SEA reporting were voluntary.45 In June 2007, the chairman of the FAF 
made it clear that the GASB was here to stay by re-stating the impetus for GASB’s initial 
creation. He argued, “There are fundamental differences between private and government 
entities that require specialized accounting and reporting standards… the GASB 
possesses the specialized expertise to set such standards for governmental entities.”46
This past year, the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 was enacted by Congress and the 
President in order to reform financial markets and attempt to prevent future economic 
crises comparable to the one experienced over the last few years. Among the many and 
wide-ranging provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, were some less noticed ones 
relating to the GASB. Two important provisions relate to the funding of the GASB and a 
study of its importance. The first allows the SEC to require a “national securities 
association” to establish “a reasonable annual accounting support fee to adequately fund 
the annual budget of the Governmental Accounting Standards Board.”
 
47 The second 
directs the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to examine the GASB’s role and 
importance in municipal securities markets and the “manner and the level at which the 
Governmental Accounting Standards Board has been funded.”48
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 The GAO is required to 
submit this report to congress within six months of the passage of the act, which is 
46  ibid., 26 
47  "Commissioner Walter Issues Remarks before 43rd Annual Securities Regulation Seminar," US Fed 
News, October 30, 2010. 
48  ibid. 
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January 21st, 2011.49
 
 The report could potentially lead to more attention and awareness of 
the GASB’s role and its strengths and shortcomings. 
C) Federal Government Accounting Standards 
 In 1990, Congress Enacted the Chief Financial Officers Act, which it 
subsequently amended in 1994 through the passage of the Government Management 
Reform Act of 1994.50 The act required that the Federal government and each of 
reporting entities produce annual audited financial statements.51 The act also created the 
position of Chief Financial Officer in each Federal government department and these 
individuals are responsible for developing systems for financial reporting and internal 
controls.52 Following the passage of the Act in 1990, the Secretary of the Treasury, the 
Comptroller General of the United States (also known as the head of the Government 
Accountability Officer (GAO)), and the Director of the Office of Management and 
Budget created the Federal Accounting Standards Advisory Board (FASAB) to determine 
the standards for federal financial reporting.53 The three associated agencies provide the 
funding necessary to operate the FASAB.54 In 1999, the FASAB was restructured to 
make it more independent of the Federal Government. This was done in order to receive 
the endorsement of the AICPA of the FASAB as the official source of GAAP for Federal 
reporting entities,.55
                                                          
49  ibid. 
 The board today is made up of three representatives chosen by the 
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board’s sponsoring agencies and six members of the public who are not Federal 
employees.56
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Chapter III: GASB Standards Case Study: Defined Benefit Pension Accounting 
Since its very creation, the politics and role of the Government Accounting 
Standards board has always been extremely complicated and controversial. Because 
GASB’s standards directly impact many entities in which politics are inherently involved, 
the GASB’s work will always be subject to being made into a broad political debate 
rather than a battle among policy wonks. However, for the GASB to live up to its 
mission, it must be able to separate itself from the purely political concerns of its actions, 
and determine the best way for governments to report “economic reality.” In the recent 
debate and process to determine potential changes to defined benefit retirement plan 
accounting, the GASB has proven itself to be too willing to let its sails be pulled by 
political winds. It is abundantly clear to those outside of government that current 
accounting standards for such plans do not provide a clear or accurate enough picture of 
the difficulties that these plans will encounter over the next few decades, and allow these 
plans to appear healthier and better funded than they are. The lack of decisive and 
effective action to change the reporting requirements of the pension liabilities of 
government entities so that they reflect the true scope and state of those liabilities, is 
evidence that the GASB is not properly equipped to be a neutral arbiter of accounting 
standards for government in its current state. 
 
A) Context of the Debate 
In January of 2006, the board commissioned a research project to ascertain the 
sufficiency of GASB Statements 25 and 27, which are the existing standards for 
28 
 
government defined benefit pension accounting.1 Additionally, between the issuance of 
25 and 27 and that time, GASB had come out with significant conceptual statements that 
govern the framework GASB uses to consider accounting standards. Concepts Statement 
3 came out in 2005 and concerned the different methods of financial statement 
communication (ex. notes versus recognition in the income statement, balance sheet, or 
statement of cash flows).2 Concepts Statement 4, which came out in 2007, concerned 
conceptual characteristics and definitions of elements of financial statements.3 The 
combination of framework changes and the staff’s research project led the board to add 
pension accounting to its technical agenda in 2008.4
On June 16
 In 2009, the GASB issued an 
invitation for interest parties to comment on pension accounting. 
th, 2010, after taking into account the view presented during the 
comment period, the GASB released their “Preliminary Views… on major issues related 
to Pension Accounting and Financial Reporting by Employers.”5 The document quickly 
lit up a firestorm among government officials, economists, union leaders and actuaries, 
although its proposals are not nearly as drastic as they could have been. Many have 
suggested that proposal does not go far enough in shinning the light on the precarious 
situation of some pensions. The result has been that some observers are not only 
questioning the accounting standards involved, but the very structure and makeup of the 
GASB.6
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2010), 1. 
  
2  ibid. 
3  ibid. 
4  ibid. 
5  ibid. 
6  Michael Corkery, "Pension Dispute Ensnares A Board," Wall Street Journal, Oct 1, 2010. 
29 
 
 
B) Nature of Defined Benefit and Defined Contribution Retirement Plans 
Defined benefit retirement obligations are more typically known as pensions. 
Employees who are entitled to the benefit are usually promised a monthly or yearly 
payment from the employee’s retirement until the time of the employee’s or the 
employees spouse’s death. The size of that employee’s pension is typically determined by 
factors such as the employee’s tenure at the organization, his or her pay levels during that 
tenure and potentially other so called “sweeteners” that may occur, such as an early 
retirement incentive that artificially raises the organization’s pension obligation. Pensions 
are called defined benefit retirement plans because the organization is then legally 
responsible for meeting the promised pension level. Typically organizations set aside 
funds and invest them in some way in order to provide for those future obligations. In the 
private sector, pension sponsors also pay a premium to a Federal corporation called the 
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), which provides insurance of the benefits 
for employees in the case of bankruptcy.7
The alternative to pensions is typically a defined contribution retirement plan, 
typically a 401(k) plan or something similar. Instead of providing a fix level of benefits 
for a certain period, an organization only promises to provide a fixed contribution to the 
employees’ plan. Employees typically then individually select investments for their plan 
based on the offering available in the plan. The employees bear all the risk for their 
plan’s investment performance, and its ability to meet their post-employment needs. The 
 There is no comparable insurance organization 
for government employer sponsored pensions. 
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vast majority of private sector organizations have switch from pension plans to 401(k) 
plans over the last few decades; however government organizations have been much 
slower to adopt 401(k) style plans.8
 
 
C) Calculation of Defined Benefit Obligations 
In order to determine how much must be set aside to properly pay employees for 
their promised benefits, organizations must use actuaries to estimate certain assumptions 
for the pension plan, typically called Actuarial Assumptions.9
For this reason, pension discount rates are very hotly debated, and it is at this 
point that corporate and government pension plan accounting standards typically start to 
defer. Until 2004, the SEC required corporations to discount their future pension 
 These assumptions include 
factors such as how long employees are expected to remain at the organization, how their 
salary is likely to progress and how long they are expected to live. The goal of this is to 
determine the timing and magnitude of payments that the pension plan will be required to 
make in the future. However, these payments are future obligations, and must be 
discounted back using a discount rate in order to provide relevant present data to compare 
with plan assets. Because of discounting, small changes in the rate used to discount a 
plan’s future payments can cause very wide swings in the size of the pension obligation 
involved, making the rate one of the most important factors involved. 
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obligations by 120% of the rate of return of 30-year Treasury securities.10 In 2004, 
Congress enacted the Pension Funding Equity Act, which was designed to ease the 
burden on hard hit industrial and transportation companies that because of their age have 
many more participants in their pension plans and much higher obligations.11 The act 
allowed corporations to instead discount their obligations at the rate of a long term 
investment grade corporate bonds.12 Because corporate bonds are considered to be riskier 
than treasury bonds which are backed by the full faith and credit of the Federal 
government, their interest rate is somewhat higher. As of late the rates have been around 
6%.13
Government pension funds, according to current GASB GAAP, are able to use the 
fund’s long run return on plan assets as a discount rate for their obligations.
   Because higher discount rates lead to lower present values, the use of corporate 
bond rates causes a current pension obligation to appear lower. Usually this will also 
mean that an organization is then able to make smaller current contributions to its plan in 
order to adequately meet its obligations, which is why industrial and airline companies 
sought the change in 2004.  
14 This level 
for most plans is within a percentage point of 8%.15
 
  
D) The Discount Rate 
                                                          
10 Pension Funding Equity Act of 2004, U.S. Statutes at Large 118 (2004) 596 
 
11 ibid. 
12 ibid. 
13 ibid. 
14  Mary Williams Walsh, "A New Plan for Valuing Pensions," The New York Times, June 25, 2010. 
15  Augustine et al., The Trillion Dollar Gap; Underfunded State Retirement Systems and the Roads to 
Reform, 35 
32 
 
The primary point of contention in the debate around accounting for pensions is 
what the proper discount rate for pension obligations should be. The June proposal 
included a significant change to how the discount rate is determined, but many of the 
more cautious people in the profession have suggested that the proposal does not nearly 
go as far as it should, while others have accused the GASB of attempting to design the 
standards in a way to force a policy outcome rather than for a financial reporting purpose. 
GASB’s opinion on the discount rate for future liabilities involves creating a new 
blended rate based on the differing risks to the fund’s payments to pensioners. It is 
GASB’s opinion that to the extent the fund is able to make future payments to pensioners 
from the projected plan assets that will result from projected returns and contributions to 
the fund, the fund may discount those liabilities at the fund’s expected rate of return on 
its investments.16 Then, for all pension liabilities that will fall after the fund’s assets are 
projected to be depleted, those liabilities should be discounted using a high quality 
municipal bond index, which would almost always be a lower rate.17 A combined 
discount rate then would be formed from those two values, and used to discount all of the 
fund’s liabilities. The GASB justified this approach by saying “because the long-term 
rate of return is not relevant to an unfunded exchange of benefits for employee 
services.”18
The effect of GASB’s proposed changes will likely balloon the current value of 
pension liabilities that have not been fully funded. For a states like New York, which was 
 In a sense, they are saying rate of return of the fund’s assets does not matter 
if there are no assets available to achieve that rate of return. 
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107% funded in fiscal year 200819, the change will likely not have any impact. States that 
are below 100% funded will most likely have to calculate the blended rate based on when 
they expect their fund to be depleted, which will raise their total liability, and decrease 
the fund’s funding ratio. For a state like Illinois, which was 54% funded in 200820 and 
whose assets are projected to be depleted by 201821
Some have questioned whether using the blended discount rate is designed to 
improve reporting, or if it is instead designed to influence the behavior of government 
entities by significantly highlighting their problems. The premise of the accusation is that 
by significantly increasing the size of projected liabilites of states that are not as well 
funded, that GASB is attempting to shame those states into increasing their funding. 
Jeremy Gold, who was formerly an advisor on a task force on pensions sponsored by the 
GASB, commented on what he believed the goal of the board was by enacting such a 
change, ''I think they hope this will be the disciplinary tool that will get everybody 
funding at the actuarial rate.”
, the effect could be astronomical. 
22
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Economists argue that the discount rate of future liabilities should reflect the 
“riskiness” of those liabilities occurring.23  Since state constitutions and other statutes 
often provide significant protections to accumulated public pension benefits, the payment 
of those benefits are, in a sense, risk free, and should be discounted as such.24 Put another 
way, because there is no chance that payments to pensioners will not be made, because 
governments cannot back out of those payments, those payments should not be 
discounted using a rate that implies there is some chance to the occurrence of those 
payments. Ultimately, discounting those payments back will provide a sense of the 
current amount of funds required to meet those future payments, assuming the current 
funds will be invested in some way.  Economic theory would suggest that the risk profile 
of that investment should be the same as the underlying cash flows that the investment 
will go towards. Otherwise, if the investment is too risky, the fund may not be able to 
meet its obligations, or if the investment has too little risk, that would require that the 
fund set aside more than funds than are necessary upfront. Since a pension fund has 
riskless obligations, economists suggest that those obligations be discounted by the US 
Government Treasury bond rate for the period of that obligation, which is generally 
considered to be risk-free. Thus, many economists have been critical of the GASB’s 
proposal, suggesting that it does not go far enough in changing the discount rate to be 
used.25
In addition to considering the use of a risk-free discount rate, two other proposals 
that the GASB considered for the discount rate were to use the rate at which the plan 
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sponsor could issue high quality municipal bonds, and a rate determined by an index of 
high quality municipal bonds.26 Using a rate from an index of high quality municipal 
bonds would be akin to what FASB has allowed public companies to use in determining 
their pension obligation. Public companies are allowed to use a rate from an index of high 
quality corporate bonds as their discount rate.27 These proposals were all rejected by the 
GASB, which they justified by stating, “None of these alternatives was consistent with 
the view expressed above that the present value of projected benefit payments should 
reflect an expectation of the employer’s projected sacrifice of resources, reduced by the 
expected return on investments.”28
One possible consequence of the GASB’s proposal is that pension funds may 
attempt to find ways to take more optimistic views about certain assumptions that 
underlie their pension liabilities, in order to avoid using the blended discount rate as 
much as possible.  One area they might be able to do this is in their determination of the 
fund’s long run rate of return, and thus their projected future returns. Another approach 
could be to project higher contributions to the fund from employees or plan sponsors. 
Boosting the projected fund returns or projected contributions to the plan would have the 
effect of making their current plan assets appear to last longer and go further towards 
funding their future obligation. Any reduction in the future liabilities that are not covered 
by current plan assets would reduce the extent that the funds have to use the much lower 
discount rate and would reduce the size of their projected liability. 
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E) New Jersey 
New Jersey has been ground zero for the public pension issue over the last couple 
of years. Two major events have turned the focus towards the Garden State: a civil suit 
by the SEC and the election of Governor Chris Christie. Both actions have brought 
additional scrutiny to New Jerseys pension practices over the past decade, and are 
continuing to cause significant repercussions. 
In August of 2010, the SEC used what limited authority it has in the municipal 
finance area by accusing New Jersey of civil fraud for improperly communicating the 
funding status of its pension fund to bond investors.29 Essentially the SEC accused New 
Jersey of improperly stating in financial disclosures related to bond offerings that the 
state was adequately funding its pension fund. During the time the SEC examined, from 
2000 to 2007, New Jersey offered sweetened benefits to many of its employees, but did 
not properly fund those benefits and in fact did not adequately fund the benefits it had 
already promised.30 Because pensions payments would have priority in a bankruptcy 
proceeding, and the additional payments required to meet pension obligations could in 
fact cause a bankruptcy in their own right, this created a risk to potential bondholders that 
was not properly disclosed in the view of the SEC. New Jersey settled the charges by 
saying they would make proper disclosures.31
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 The SEC’s actions opened the eyes of 
many in the field, as most people in the field believe that the SEC has very little authority 
to provide oversight in the area. Former SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt has urged the SEC 
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to continue pursuing this area, and for it to be more aggressive about the settlements it 
seeks in such cases.32
In addition to the SEC’s actions, recently elected Governor Chris Christie has 
brought significant attention to New Jersey’s pension benefits and obligations, and the 
financial soundness of its plans
 
33. Governor Christie has been using the precarious state 
of New Jersey’s pensions to urge for reform of pension benefits given to employees in 
the state, and has proposed that additional benefits given by the State Legislature in 2001 
be rolled back.34
 Over the past 10 years, New Jersey has had a horrendous record of making its 
necessary pension payments, and has essentially been using its funds as a semi-off-
balance sheet borrowing tool. In 1998, New Jersey’s pension fund was 106% 
funded.
  
35Over the next 6 years, New Jersey consistently provided no more than 30% of 
the contribution required.36 The result was that by 2008, New Jersey’s pension system 
was no more than 73% funded37, below the 80% level that most experts consider to be a 
barometer of a reasonably funded pension fund.38
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rate of New Jersey’s expected rate of return of 8.25%39 rather than the yield on recently 
issued municipal bonds of 2.94%.40
In 2010, New Jersey was supposed to make a $3.1 billion pension payment, of 
which $1.2 billion would have gone to cover current benefits and $1.8 billion would have 
gone towards meeting New Jersey’s unfunded actuarial accrued liability.
 It is easy to see why state legislators and the 
governor may tempted to take such steps, as borrowing from the states own pension fund 
is less complicated than using public markets. It also obscures the “borrowing” by 
placing it in the footnotes to the state’s financial statements rather than on the balance 
sheet, as normal debt would appear. However the cost to the state is immense, and further 
compounds the problems the state’s pension system currently has. 
 41 
Unfortunately, New Jersey made no contribution at all.42 According to analysis done by 
Professor Joshua D. Rauh at Northwestern University for the National Bureau of 
Economic Research, even using the 8% return on investment based discount rate that 
New Jersey currently uses, New Jersey could exhaust the assets in its fund by 2019, and 
that’s assuming that the state makes the required contributions for any new benefits 
accumulated between now and then.43
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with the State’s stated obligation of $133 billion, using 2009 data44. Those numbers 
compare with New Jersey’s pension assets of $67.2 billion.45
Over the next few years, New Jersey will have to make significant and difficult 
choices related to its pension system. New Jersey faces massive shortfalls in its pension 
plan; even when using current account methods that arguably understate the size of its 
obligation. In the state one of the highest relative tax burdens in the nation
  
46
 
, residents of 
New Jersey are likely to reject using increased tax dollars to cover the unfunded pension 
obligations. Of advantage to the rest of the United States is that the increased focus in 
New Jersey on benefits promises made may encourage other states to take a more sober 
minded look at the costs of the benefits they have provided and could provide in the 
future.  
F) The Magnitude of the Problem: the other 49 States 
It is important to recognize also, that even without reforms that will likely boost 
pension liabilities for government entities across the board, many state pension funds are 
in dire positions as is. A report published by the Pew Center on the States in February of 
2010, estimated the aggregate underfunding of pension plans across all 50 States, 
aggregate underfunding being the difference between their present-value-discounted 
liabilities and their assets, is $452 billion.47
                                                          
44  Robert Novy-Marx and Joshua D. Rauh, "Public Pension Promises: How Big are they and what are they 
Worth?" SSRN eLibrary (2010). 
Additionally, the report said that 21 states 
45  ibid. 
46  Special Report; State and Local Burdens as Income Growth Outpaces Tax Growth (Washington, D.C.: 
Tax Foundation, 2008), 2, http://www.taxfoundation.org/files/sr163.pdf (accessed 20 November, 2010). 
47  Augustine et al., The Trillion Dollar Gap; Underfunded State Retirement Systems and the Roads to 
Reform, 3 
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have pension funds that are below the 80% threshold.48 However the report gives many 
caveats to its findings that would suggest the magnitude of the problem could be 
significantly worse. The first is that the report used data as of the end of fiscal year 2008, 
which for most governments ended on June 30th. This means that the significant 
investment losses incurred by most funds in 2008 are not fully reflected, especially in 
states that allow for investment gain or loss smoothing over a period of multiple years.49 
The second important caveat is that the present value of each funds’ liabilities was 
calculated using the discount rate that the fund currently uses, typically its historical rate 
of investment returns.50 As mentioned above, there is significant debate as to the validity 
of using that number as the discount rate. There are currently no existing estimates as to 
what the unfunded liabilities may look like nationwide under the proposed new GASB 
standards, however there are estimates for other discount rates. Professor Rauh, after 
standardizing other actuarial assumptions, estimated that the present value of the pension 
liabilities of all 50 states exceed current plan assets by $1.26 trillion if using a taxable 
municipal bond index rate as a discount rate, and $2.49 trillion if using a treasury bond 
discount rate.51
The underfunding of pensions can be an issue that literally compounds on itself. 
Some pension funds, suffering from underfunding, have become tempted to attempt to 
boost returns in order to “grow” out of the problem.
 
52
                                                          
48  ibid., 3 
 To boost returns, those funds can 
start investing in areas in which they have not previously, and potentially take on greater 
49  ibid., 1 
50  ibid., 54 
51  Novy-Marx and Rauh, Public Pension Promises: How Big are they and what are they Worth?, 5 
52  G. Crawford, "2 Approaches to 1 Problem," Pensions & Investments 38, no. 5 (Mar 8, 2010), 1. 
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risk. That greater risk can frequently come back to harm those funds during market 
downturns by putting the fund in an even worse position than it would have had it not 
taken the risk. For example, CALPERS, the pension fund for state and local government 
employees in California was burned by private equity and real estate investments it 
started to make following the burst of the tech bubble in 2000.53 Typically those 
investments were made instead of safer but much lower returning investments.54 In fiscal 
year 2009, CALPERS real estate portfolio lost 37% of its value.55
 
 To be sure, some of the 
movement into high risk areas by pension funds would have resulted regardless of their 
funding status, because of the envy that exists of the high returns earned at other large 
institutional investors such as Yale University’s endowment. But just as a blackjack 
player down significantly to the house starts to double his bets to make up for lost 
ground, pension funds often make riskier bets to attempt to make up for insufficient 
funding, and frequently suffer for it. 
G) Other Considerations 
One common reason would-be pension accounting reformers have pushed for 
better recognition of pension obligations, is to get voters and other interested parties 
focused on the issue of municipal compensation. Former SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt 
has argued that there is a significant disconnect between the retirement benefits that are 
offered to public employees and the cost to fund those obligations.56
                                                          
53  Michael Corkery et al., "Risky, Ill-Timed Land Deals Hit Calpers," Wall Street Journal, Dec 17, 2008. 
 In a sense he argues 
54  ibid. 
55  A. Jacobius, "System does some Real Estate Housecleaning," Pensions & Investments 38, no. 21 (Oct 
18, 2010), 5. 
56  Levitt and Turner, Pension Shell Games Threaten Markets: Arthur Levitt, Lynn, Turner 
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that the present decisions of politicians to provide larger pensions does not adequately 
cause some well understood short term financial or political cost that might make them 
hesitate in their decision. Instead the financial cost is opaque enough and delayed enough, 
that politicians do not have to spend or lose any of their “political capital” to provide 
those benefits, but instead significant political capital from being generous to a 
significant political constituency. Levitt proposes that politicians only be able to provide 
additional benefits only if they agree to fund them fully, in a sense “pay as you go”.57
                                                          
57  ibid. 
 
Such a requirement is outside the scope of the GASB’s purview, as accounting is just the 
means to report such discrepancies, not a provider of public policy implications. However 
the thinking goes that greater and more accurate disclosure of pension obligations will 
lead voters and the markets to have the information they need to be better able to hold 
public pension funds and the politicians responsible for them and accountable for the 
decisions they make.  
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Chapter IV. Policy Implications 
As it currently stands, a the Government Accounting Standards is in many regards not 
adequately positioned and structured to provide the accounting and financial reporting 
guidance that capital providers and the public at large need to be critical examiners of 
government performance and financial health. There are three primary areas where the 
GASB is due for significant reforms: the GASB’s organizational structure, regulatory 
role, and funding sources. 
 
A) Organizational Changes 
The makeup of the GASB and its structure is not adequate for the performance of 
its role as the determiner of financial reporting standards. In many ways it is best to 
compare the structure of GASB too its sibling organization, the FASB, since they 
perform very similar roles but over different areas of the economy. The first change the 
GASB should make is to require that serving on its board be a full-time job. The financial 
reporting standards of governments are no less complicated than that of public companies 
and the debates around those standards are no less fraught. GASB board members should 
be devoting comparable time and effort to the development of those standard by serving 
the board full-time, instead of part-time as they currently do. 
A further change to the board should be a requirement that board members not 
hold a concurrent role that may cause, or at the very least create the appearance of a 
conflict of interest in determining financial reporting standards. Four of the seven board 
members at present work full-time as elected officials or government finance officials. 
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There exists a high likelihood that the board could examine reporting issues that would 
make life more difficult or directly harm the careers of people working in state or local 
government. For example, as mentioned previously, a change in the discount rate used for 
pension liabilities has a significant effect on the present value size of that liability. If the 
size of that liability grows because of a decrease in the discount rate used, that would 
likely force sponsoring government entities to contribute additional assets to the plan, in 
order for the plan to be properly funded. By making higher contributions to its pension 
plan, a sponsoring entity will likely not be able devote as much funds to other things that 
are more popular to the voting public, like government services or a tax cut. Taxes may 
even need to be raised to support the additional contributions. Cutting popular programs 
or increasing taxes to fund the benefits of retired employees may be difficult to explain to 
the voting public and not politically palatable. An elected official who serves on the 
GASB may be unwilling to make a decision to set a more appropriate discount rate if 
they have to deal with electoral repercussions locally. In a sense, the process of the 
board’s determination of the way to properly reflect economic reality could be impeded 
by the natural self-interest of its members.  
In the accounting profession, the mere appearance of any potential conflict of 
interest, regardless of whether there is a conflict in fact, is held to be extremely 
problematic if not worse. Sarbanes-Oxley banned public accounting firms from providing 
non-audit services to audit clients, because of the conflicts of interest that could result in 
competing to provide other services to clients with whom the firms are supposed to be 
independent.1
                                                          
1  "A Conflict of Interest ?; Accountancy Firms," The Economist, October 16, 2010, . 
 For the board tasked with determining accounting standards –which should 
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theoretically be the leading example for the profession– to have members with direct 
potential conflicts makeup the majority of its board is very nearly an embarrassment to 
the profession. 
The frequently provided justification for having government members serve on 
the board, is that they are most familiar with the difficulties, unique aspects and processes 
of government financial reporting.2
 
 They are correct in suggesting that the GASB should 
contain members who are experts in government finance. However, it is clearly not the 
case that those members must concurrently serve in roles that provide that expertise. 
They could be retired from prior roles, or work for firms that interact with or assist 
government entities that prepare financial statements. Members of the FASB must be 
independent of the people and companies that they affect; it seems both logical and 
necessary that GASB members should be as well.  
B) Funding Changes 
The above mentioned potential reforms for the GASB come at a likely come at 
some expense. The total expenses incurred by the GASB in 2009 were $7.22 million, 
compared with $29.14 million in “recoverable expenses” by the FASB during that year.3
                                                          
2  Michael Corkery, "Pension Dispute Ensnares A Board," Wall Street Journal, Oct 1, 2010. 
 
While it does not seem likely that that the GASB size and expense would approach that 
of the FASB, it is certainly reasonable to expect that the gap between the two will 
narrow. To achieve the aforementioned reforms, additional funds will be necessary.  
3  Financial Accounting Foundation 2009 Annual Report (Norwalk, CT: Financial Accounting Foundation, 
2010), 3. 
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In addition to the additional resources necessary for the implementation of 
organization reforms to the GASB, the GASB’s current funding is fairly tenuous and 
questionable as is. In the first place, GASB’s direct revenue does not cover the entirety of 
its annual expenses4
To provide stable and adequate funds, the GASB should be funded using a 
method similar to that of the FASB, where the necessary expenses to implement standard 
setting are determined, and then are assessed in a non-voluntary way on the entities for 
which the standards are set. As mentioned above, the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 gives the 
SEC the ability to require that another financial regulatory organization enact this. The 
non-voluntary aspect of this assessment is important for two reasons: it will reduce the 
cyclicality of the funds the GASB needs to perform its role and it removes the appearance 
of conflict of interest in receiving funds from the entities that its standard affect. This is 
accomplished by removing the ability of those entities to withhold funds should they not 
be pleased with how the GASB’s standards affect them. 
, which is not a sustainable method of funding the organization. 
Additionally, half the GASB’s current revenue comes from state and local government 
contributions, which undermines the GASB’s mission by creating the appearance of a 
conflict of interest by relying on funds from the entities its standards are likely to impact, 
either positively or negatively. The other half of its revenue comes from publications that 
have shown significant cyclicality over the last few years, and do not appear to be stable 
enough source of funds for the core operations of the GASB.  
The difficult aspect of this fee assessment is in determining which entities must be 
subject to the fee, and what basis should be used to distribute the contributions to the 
                                                          
4  Government Accounting Standards Board Statement of Budgeted Revenues and Expenses for the Year 
Ending December 31, 2010 (Norwalk, CT: Government Accounting Standards Board, 2009), 1. 
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government entities. With public companies, weighting by the market capitalization of a 
company versus the market capitalization of the market for public companies is a simple 
and logical way to divide the expenses. For government entities this becomes more 
difficult because the governments do not have a similar measure of value, and because 
many government entities do not issue securities of any kind, making it more difficult in 
practice to justify requiring them to contribute to the GASB. Additionally, there are 
hundreds of thousands of relatively small government entities, from small townships and 
public authorities to school boards. It could be potentially very difficult and overly 
expensive to implement a method of calculating and receiving payment from all of those 
entities. 
One intriguing possibility for a fee to fund GASB is to assess it at the state level 
rather than at a more local level. The state is the foundational building block for all 
government entities in the United States, from the Federal Government to the smallest 
public authority. The states gives rise to local government entities such as school boards, 
public authorities and cities, and is the ultimate the authority on whether they are 
permitted exist or not. It would then follow that states should take responsibility for the 
cost of providing adequate financial reporting for all of the entities they have given birth 
to. If the states wanted to, they could then come up with a method of allocating and 
collecting their respective fee responsibility from the entities within their boundaries, but 
the GASB or an agent of it would not be responsible for such potentially difficult 
determinations. The question then becomes how to divide the fee proportional to each 
state. One method could be to determine the total spending by all entities within a state, 
and then weight each state’s fee assessment by its proportion of total state and local 
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government spending in the United States. However, due to the immense number of 
government entities in the United States, such data might be difficult to attain and its 
accuracy may be questionable. A very simple and logical way to divide the expense 
would be based on the proportional population located within a state. While population 
likely does not directly correlate with the number of entities within a state, and thus the 
demand it implicitly places on the GASB, it would be a relatively fair and easy way to 
calculate the allocation.   Whichever way chosen, the burden would not be significant in 
the scale of state budgets. For example, if the “recoverable cost” were to be $25.00 
million, California, which has the largest population share at 12.03% of US Population in 
20095, it would be responsible for approximately $3 million in fees, out of a state general 
fund budget in 2009 of over $119 billion.6
While it is likely that states would be resistant to paying even such a minor fee, 
there is a method that should be used to ensure the proper participation by all the states. 
The Federal government, through Congressional legislation, should make the release of 
any or some portion of the funds dispersed from it to a state contingent on the state 
having paid its bill to the GASB. The precedent for this is The National Minimum 
Drinking Age Act of 1984, which required states to set their drinking age to 21 or face a 
10% reduction in highway funds from the Federal Government.
 
7
                                                          
5  "California QuickFacts from the US Census Bureau," US Census Bureau, 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/06000.html (accessed 27 November, 2010). 
 In addition, since the 
states will be required to pay the fees in order to insulate the GASB from the power of the 
6  Adam Nagourney, "Schwarzenegger and Legislators Reach Deal on Long-Delayed California Budget," 
The New York Times, October 8, 2010. 
7  Steven R. Weisman, "Reagan Signs Law Linking Federal Aid to Drinking Age," The New York Times, 
July 18, 1984. 
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purse, there would not be any incentive for the GASB to tailor its standards any way or 
show any favoritism towards larger states that may be providing higher fees. 
Having the Federal government indirectly require the payment of fees to the 
GASB is also very appropriate considering that the Federal government should be very 
concerned with the accounting standards used by the states and localities that it is 
providing funds to. While the Federal government already has significant reporting 
standards of its own for states that utilize its funds, the Federal government still has an 
interest in the financial reporting that states and local governments use on an everyday 
basis accurately reflect economic reality. 
It is worth mentioning another method of funding that has been somewhat 
implemented currently but is not a viable long-term option: a voluntary assessment on 
municipal bonds. The first major problem with funding the GASB through this method is 
that it is extremely problematic that the assessment is voluntary, since that makes its 
funding subject to the financial health of the parties involved in the municipal bond 
transactions. This is evidenced by the fact that between 2008 and 2009, there was an 
approximately 92% drop in the funds provided to the GASB from Voluntary Municipal 
Bond Fee Assessment Program.8
                                                          
8  Financial Accounting Foundation 2009 Annual Report, 3 
 In addition, the voluntary funds would allow 
organizations to choose to pay the fee or not as a way of attempting to influence the 
GASB. Regardless, if the fees on the municipal bonds were to be made involuntary, 
municipal bond activity varies enough to make a fee tied to it not an adequate source of 
stable funds for the organization’s activities. The immense need for the GASB to be a 
strong standard setter exists regardless of the economy and the bond market’s current 
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position, so its source of funds should not determine its activity so much as its activities 
should determine how much funding it needs, within reason and subject to supervision  
Allowing the GASB to assess a fee on the states based on relative population and 
its “recoverable expenses” would provide the GASB with a secure and consistent source 
of funds that is resistant to political influence. The state assessment would enable GASB 
to gain additional credibility by ensuring that it is both adequately funded to meet the 
goals of its mission as well ensure that it has the financial stability to continue to be a 
going concern. Without such a source of funds, the GASB is in danger of coming under 
increasing political influence and its influence would be undermined by the consistent 
doubts as to its financial stability. 
 
C) Regulatory Role Changes 
Changes to the regulatory structure surrounding the determination of accounting 
standards for governments is an important element of making the GASB more effective 
and more accountable. Regulatory changes that should be made primarily revolve around 
giving the SEC increased regulatory authority around the issuance of municipal 
securities. The SEC was created with the specific purpose of protecting investors by 
creating and enforcing standards of disclosure for the issuance of securities. While 
municipal securities and their borrowing entities may have many unique characteristics to 
them compared to their private sector counterparts, their distinctiveness should not allow 
those issuers to have less oversight.  
In order to provide the proper regulation of the municipal securities market, 
Congress should amend the Securities Act of 1933 to remove the Tower Amendment and 
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allow the SEC to require that municipal securities issuers provide issuance documents, 
rather than requiring the issuer’s underwriters to provide them. In addition, Congress 
should remove the exemption from registration and periodic reporting requirements for 
municipal issuers in the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 
The combination of these two changes would allow the SEC to create a financial 
disclosure regulatory structure similar to what exists for corporate equity and debt 
issuances. Removing the exemptions would bring municipal securities fully under the 
provisions of the 1933 and 1934 laws meaning that SEC could then require that 
municipal security issuance documents conform to GAAP, of which the SEC is the final 
arbiter. In addition, because of the explicit authority given to the SEC to delegate 
accounting standard setting to an independent board under Sarbanes-Oxley’s 
modification of the 1933 and 1934 acts9
                                                          
9  Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, U.S. Statutes at Large 116 (2002) 745 
, it could substantially delegate standard setting 
to the GASB, as it currently does with the FASB, elevating its role. Giving the SEC these 
powers would also allow it to step up its enforcement of government entities that do not 
meet accounting standards provided by the GASB, ensuring further adherence and 
emphasizing that governments will be held accountable for their financial reporting. 
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Despite being a little known organization outside those who work in or around 
government finance, the Government Accounting Standards Board has an important role 
to play for a significant portion of the economic activity that occurs in the United States. 
The GASB can be a key tool to provide comparability in financial reporting across 
different government entities. The GASB is relied upon by the municipal securities 
markets as a neutral arbiter of the accounting and reporting standards that will allow 
market participants to make informed investment decisions. Without it, people would 
hold much less confidence in the municipals market, risk and thus interest rate would be 
higher, and much more significant information asymmetries would exist than currently 
do. The GASB is also relied upon by the public at-large, albeit without their knowledge, 
to provide comparability in such a way that they can be informed and critical readers 
government of the financial reports.  
Conclusion 
The GASB’s role is so important, that much more attention needs to be paid to it 
by the general public, the SEC and Congress. The debate around defined benefit pension 
accounting, and the insufficient action that the board is proposing, has revealed the 
weaknesses of the GASB. All of its stakeholders must consider reforms in how it is 
structured, its regulatory environment, and how it will be funded in order to maintain this 
role. The GASB’s structure is such that its members can be a part of it while holding 
positions with government entities that may impair their ability to be impartial arbiters. 
This potentially undermines the standard creation process, as well as the board’s 
credibility. The GASB should also be put in a stronger regulatory position by removing 
exemptions that currently exist for municipal securities, and allowing them to fall under 
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existing regulatory powers provided to the SEC for public companies. Giving the SEC 
regulatory oversight would give the GASB a much more definitive position as the 
standard-setter for governments, and give the GASB a strong ally in enforcing its 
provisions. Finally the GASB needs a permanent source of funding that will allow it to 
fulfill its role without any hesitation or doubts as to its longevity and bias.   
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